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an introductionInterest groups play a central role in Irish society by
theoretically acting as a conduit between citizens
and the government. Interest groups are, however,
much more than simple conduits and lobby in the
expectation that they will receive some tangible
beneﬁts for their efforts. In that context, the access
and expectation such groups have to, and on, Irish
policymakers can be of great signiﬁcance for policy
outcomes in the Irish state. Interest group activity in
Ireland spans numerous strands and can be
identiﬁed on three levels: social partnership, where
sectional groups, such as trade unions, employers
and farmers’ interests, had central roles on the
economic governance of the state between 1987 and
2009; cause advocacy, where groups attempt to
inﬂuence policy outcomes in speciﬁc areas; and
private lobbying, where a feature of policymaking
in Ireland in recent years has been the increasingly
vigorous lobbying on behalf of business or
private interests, in an attempt to inﬂuence speciﬁc
government policy.
The aim of this special issue of the Journal of
Public Affairs is to shine some light on the opaque
and curious practice of Irish style lobbying. The
question of access to decision making is crucial
to interest group politics in Ireland. Once that
access has been granted, interest groups develop an
expectation that because they are inside the inner
sanctum of power, governments will somehow do
their bidding. The truth as the articles in this special
issue makes clear is somewhat more circumspect.
Social partnership was the behemoth bywhich the
Irish state governed itself from 1987 to just after the
economic tsunami hit Ireland in the second half of
2008 when the ﬁnancial crisis saw the Irish banks
literally run out of money and having to be rescued
by the infamous bank guarantee scheme. As Peter
Stafford points out in his forensic examination of the
structure and process of social partnership, the truth
was that the real work was done by a small set of
people, while many of the members of both unions
and employers remained sidelined on the fringes of
power. Over 20 years of social partnership led,
however, to a corrosion of intellectual thinking in
Irish policymaking whereby no one in power
seemed to have even the slightest idea of what toCopyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.do once the economy started to go into freefall after
the boom years of the Celtic Tiger ended with a
signiﬁcant thud in 2008.
The articles by Stephen Weir and Lorna Jennings
assess the workings of individual interest groups
and analyse their roles in the area of taxi policy and
tobacco control and smuggling, respectively. Weir
outlines how the taxi lobby initially exerted
signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the control and supply of
the service. Once, however, the simplicity of the
optimum policy solution for the public at large
became clear, then the taxi lobby was unable to
continue to hold their seemingly vice‐like grip on
the supply of taxi services. Furthermore, the taxi
lobby’s inability to accept any compromise left it
fatally wounded once the government felt they
could no longer allow the wider voting public to be
disadvantaged by existing taxi policy. In that
context, the access that the taxi lobby had to
individual politicians was redundant in the face of
a government dedicated to opening up the service
as it would have potentially damaged them
electorally had it not.
Jennings, in her sophisticated study of the
Irish Cancer Society’s campaign on the issue of
tax on tobacco, notes that the Society realised that
if it concentrated exclusively in the health arena
in its 2008 pre‐budget submission, then it would
simply have failed in its aim. This is an important
case study of an organisation needing to move
beyond its own limited space, in this case health
beneﬁts, and instead direct itself to the wider
ﬁscal space by engaging on an economic level
in order to gain a wider and more sympathetic
hearing from the government. Thus, the Irish
Cancer Society was able to manoeuvre instantly
into a position of inﬂuence by widening out its
approach, whereas by steadfastly keeping to a
traditional agenda and approach, the taxi lobby
ultimately lost out.
The articles by Murphy, Hogan and Chari and by
Kevin Rafter both examine the complex question of
regulation in Irish policymaking. Rafter carefully
outlines a signiﬁcant consequence of the Irish ban
on broadcast political advertising in that both
political parties and interest groups are prevented
72 Editorialfrom using the most effective means of directly
communicating with voters: television and radio.
This has consequently resulted in the lack of
equality in the treatment of different groups.
Although the ban on paid political advertising
applies to third party groups such as trade unions
and charitable bodies, they do not have a corre-
sponding entitlement to broadcasts at election times
as do political parties, thus creating a very unequal
playing pitch. The wide ranging restrictions on
political advertising essentially preclude all forms
of advertising on radio and television by lobby
groups and thus limit their access to the wider
public. This is an important conceptual point in that
lobbying activity is not simply geared towards
government but reaches much further. For Ireland,
however, such political outreach is curiously pro-
hibited despite Rafter’s empirical data, suggesting
that the public are not averse to receiving such
messages.
Murphy, Hogan and Chari offer the results of one
of the ﬁrst signiﬁcant questionnaires on lobbying
regulation, given to politicians, lobbyists and
administrators in the Republic of Ireland. They
discovered that, despite lobbying having never
been regulated in Ireland, large majorities of
respondents believed lobbyists should be required
to register when lobbying and that any contribu-
tions lobbyists make to political parties should be
open to public scrutiny. This suggests that Irish
politicians, administrators and, in particular, lobby-
ists would be willing to accept lobbying regulations
being introduced in a polity that has suffered a
dramatic crisis of conﬁdence due to the economic
collapse that has basically seen Ireland’s ﬁnancial
affairs being run by the International Monetary
Fund. Such regulation by opening up to public
scrutiny as to who has access to the levers of power
in Ireland should go some way to renewing a
modicum of conﬁdence in how the Irish state
governs itself.
Gillian Smith also uses a questionnaire to shed
much needed light on Irish attitudes towards
political corruption. By gaining the views of elect-
ed representatives to a sample of hypothetical
scenarios, Smith was able to measure the effec-
tiveness of the ethics legislation introduced in
Ireland since 1995. Her ﬁndings show that elected
representatives of the national parliament have
divergent perceptions on what constitutes cor-
rupt behaviour. Importantly, the lack of consensus
among representatives to many corrupt scenar-
ios and their acceptance of many acts that
are proscribed by the ethics laws indicate that
these laws are not yet having the intended effect.
In that context, the calls of scholars such as
Murphy, Hogan and Chari and McGrath, for the
implementation of lobbying regulation in Ireland,
while necessary, will hardly be the panacea to
corruption in Ireland.Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.Jonathan Fallon also considers the question of
access in his lively insider account of lobbying in
the corridors of the Irish parliament. He percep-
tively makes the point that if lobbying in Ireland is
to become accountable, transparent and open, then
lobbying activities must be clearly deﬁned and
those who sign up to this must gain from it and
there can be no beneﬁt for those who do not
declare lobbying activities. This mirrors the point
articulated by Murphy, Hogan and Chari that
lobbying regulation must state exactly what lobby-
ing is and what it is not. For Fallon, the lobbying
process must start from a point that looks not at
how lobbying is limited as a practice in itself but
how bad lobbying is limited and good practice
encouraged.
The tumultuous Irish general election of February
2011, as McGrath points out, was notable for
the concentration placed on reform of the political
system by all the main political parties. This
included the governing Fianna Fáil party who
under a new leader announced some truly radical
notions (at least for Ireland) including bringing
non‐elected citizens into the cabinet. Lobbying
reform was central to the planks of Fianna Fáil
and the Green Party, as well as Fine Gael and
Labour who were widely expected to form the new
government after the election. There was a vague
commitment to lobbying reform in the Programme
for Government of the Fianna Fáil, Green Party
and Progressive Democrat coalition after the 2007
election, which was ﬁrmed up when the
programme was reconstituted in 2009. This was,
to no one’s surprise, let slide as the government
slowly fell apart by late 2010. The Fine Gael/
Labour coalition elected in 2011 with a massive
majority has committed itself to introducing a
register of lobbyists in its Programme for Govern-
ment. Yet, it is the structure of the system that is
the crucial point. In designing a system of
regulation of lobbyists, it is crucial to write into
the legislation why the establishment of a register
of lobbyists is taking place and what it covers. It
should also explicitly point out what it does not
cover. Citizens need to be able to contact their
representatives. Putting in place a register of
lobbyists need not affect that. As McGrath notes,
a comprehensive package of legislation with input
from lobbyists themselves should be ﬂexible
enough to allow for adjustments over time as
new issues emerge and as lobbying practice
develops. In that context, lobbying—which right-
fully remains an important part of the democratic
process—would crucially come to be seen as an
asset to the process of democracy in Ireland and
not as the liability it is believed to be by many
today.
We close by thanking a number of people for
their contributions to this special issue—our au-
thors who produced such excellent and insightfulJ. Public Affairs 11, 71–73 (2011)
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Editorial 73articles; the journal’s co‐editors who encouraged
us at every step of the process; those colleagues
who reviewed submissions for us and whose
comments materially improved the articles; and
the Political Studies Association of Ireland’s
specialist group on Interest Groups and Lobby-
ing, which funded a one‐day conference held at
Dublin City University in 2010 at which most of
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